Significant Cases

Leach v. Hoven, 69 S.W.3d 924 (Mo. App. 2002)

Patricia Leach ("Client") appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Circuit Court dismissing her legal malpractice petition against David Hoven ("Attorney") and his law firm for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Client [*925] argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition because she stated all the elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice, and the court further erred in striking from her petition her claim for attorney's fees.

Peterson v. Medley, 25 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. App. 2000)

H.L. Peterson et. al. ("Peterson") appeals from the decision granting Howard Wittner and his firm's, Wittner, Poger and Rosenblum, P.C. ("Wittner"), motion for summary judgment in this action for legal malpractice. We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find that there is no genuine issue of material fact and Wittner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo.banc 1993).

Novich v. Husch & Eppenberger, 24 S.W.3d 734 (Mo. App 2001)

Appellant was a shareholder in a corporation that was assigned a lease of property. Under the assignment's terms, the shareholders agreed to indemnify the assignor for any defaults under the lease and personally guaranteed the obligation to the landlord. The corporation defaulted on its lease obligations. Landlord filed suit for damages under the lease. Appellee attorneys accepted service, but later obtained leave from the trial court to withdraw as counsel. With the exception of appellant, the shareholders obtained new counsel and settled the lawsuit. A judgment was entered against appellant for damages under the lease. Appellant filed a legal malpractice claim against appellee attorneys. The court held that appellant's claim that landlord would have settled the claim against him was speculative and inconsistent with landlord's subsequent actions, and since appellant failed to prove he would have been successful except for the negligence of appellees, his legal malpractice claim must fail.

Saidawi v. Giovanni's Little Place, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App. 1999)

Plaintiff employee brought an action against defendant employer for intentional tort, piercing the corporate veil, disregarding the corporate entity, and fraudulent transfer, when he could not collect on a worker's compensation award. Defendant transferred assets to his shareholder who in turn transferred them to another corporation. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal and judgment that concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim and because the fraudulent transfer claim was time-barred. The court reversed the judgment and remanded, holding that plaintiff's petition stated a cause of action for intentional tort, piercing the corporate veil, and disregarding the corporate entity and that plaintiff timely filed a claim for fraudulent transfer.

OUTCOME: The judgment dismissing plaintiff's action was reversed because the court found that plaintiff stated a cause of action for intentional tort, piercing the corporate veil, and disregarding the corporate entity, and that plaintiff timely filed a claim for fraudulent transfer.

Pohlmann v. Bil-Jax, Inc., 954 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. App. 1997)

Plaintiff was injured when a scaffold on which he was working collapsed. Plaintiff brought a products liability action against the manufacturer, and the jury found in his favor. The trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for a new trial as to damages only after plaintiff declined to accept a remittitur. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant argued that plaintiff did not prove that there were sufficient minimum contacts with the State such that the State could exercise jurisdiction over the manufacturer without violating due process. The court held that plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proof that the manufacturer had sufficient minimum contacts with the State to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff presented no evidence that defendant sold, advertised, or marketed its scaffolds in the state. The fact that the manufacturer assigned the State to a sales representative as a territory, without some evidence that the manufacturer exercised control over the activities of that representative regarding sales in the state, was not sufficient to establish minimum contacts. The mere likelihood that a product would find it way to the State did not satisfy due process.

Lick Creek Sewer Systems, Inc. v. Bank of Bourbon, 747 S.W.2d 317 (Mo. App. 1988)

The debtors gave a mortgage to the bank. The bank foreclosed on its deed of trust. In an earlier action, the debtors had sued the bank, the trustee, and a bank officer for alleged irregularities in the foreclosure. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice as to the bank and the trustee but not the officer. Then the debtors dismissed the first suit as to all parties without prejudice, an action agreed to by all. The debtors filed another suit, alleging illegal disposition of a surplus from the sale, violation of fiduciary duty, wrongful foreclosure, and conversion. The bank, trustee, and officer sought dismissal, which the trial court granted. The court reversed and remanded. The court held that the dismissal without prejudice superseded the dismissal with prejudice. The failure to pay over the surplus claim as to the trustee stood. The tortious interference claim failed because a party to the contract could not wrongfully interfere with it. The conspiracy claim stood. The wrongful foreclosure claim was recast as a breach of contract claim against the bank but stated no claim against the officer. The conversion claim stood against the bank and the officer.

OUTCOME: The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the debtors' claims against the bank, bank officer, and trustee. The court specifically allowed the failure to pay a surplus claim, disallowed the tortious interference claim, allowed the conspiracy and conversion claims, and recast the wrongful foreclosure claim as a breach of contract claim against the bank.

Calhoun v. Lang, 694 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. App. 1985)

The attorneys brought an action on behalf of the client for racial discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e) et seq. (Title VII) but the action was dismissed with prejudice because the attorneys failed to respond to discovery requests. The attorneys tried to correct the error by filing a second suit based on racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981, but it was barred by the statute of limitations. The client requested a jury trial in the instant action, but the trial court denied the request because jury trials were not available for Title VII actions. The trial court then concluded that the client would not have prevailed in the underlying Title VII action and dismissed the action. The court reversed the judgment. The court held that the client was entitled to a jury trial because his malpractice claim was for the attorney's mishandling of both the Title VII claim and the § 1981 claim, and the client was entitled to a jury trial on the underlying § 1981 claim.

OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment dismissing the client's legal malpractice action and remanded for a new trial.